Key takeaways
- Direct exposure of port 3671 to the internet surrenders physical controls to automated attacks.
- Creating a dedicated VLAN is imperative to isolate home automation gateways from domestic connected devices.
- Remote access is carried out exclusively via a VPN tunnel or an approved encrypted gateway.
- The key file and project passwords must mandatorily be handed over to the client.
Refusing Direct Opening of Port 3671 and Isolating the Bus on a Dedicated Local Network
A standard KNX IP gateway uses the KNXnet/IP tunnelling or routing protocol via UDP port 3671. Without active KNX IP Secure encryption, this protocol includes no native authentication: a value write telegram transmitted over this link is immediately executed by the bus devices. If this port is subjected to port forwarding (NAT/PAT) on the internet access router, any external crawler can scan the public IP address, inject frames onto the bus, and operate roller shutters, disarm technical alarms, or release electric strikes and motorised locks. This configuration method constitutes a major technical fault that the telematics technician categorically refuses to execute, even in the presence of a written request from the client wishing to visualise their installation without software constraints.
The first protective measure consists in partitioning equipment on the local network. In a modern commercial or residential installation, workstations, televisions, and consumer connected devices often share the same subnet. If one of these hosts is compromised by malware, the attacker gains full visibility of the home automation gateway via multicast discovery requests (address 224.0.23.12). The telematics technician systematically implements a virtual local area network (VLAN) dedicated to building management, separate from the multimedia network and the guest network.
| Network zone | Assignment | Filtering rules towards the bus | Internet access |
|---|---|---|---|
| Home Automation VLAN | KNX IP gateways, supervisory servers, wall-mounted touchscreens | Traffic permitted only from designated administration workstations | Blocked inbound, restricted to NTP/update servers outbound |
| Users VLAN | Desktop PCs, laptops, domestic tablets | Permitted only towards the HTTPS port of the supervisory system | Full filtered access |
| Guest / IoT VLAN | External smartphones, voice assistants, televisions | Complete isolation: no traffic routed towards the home automation bus | Direct web access only |
The floor managed switch applies 802.1Q tagging on the uplink port and assigns the physical port of the KNX IP interface to this untagged technical VLAN. The router or firewall then enforces a strict rule: no packet originating from an unauthorised subnet may reach port 3671, either in unicast or multicast. Controllers and subcontractors ensure, through appropriate organisational and technical measures, adequate personal data security relative to the risk incurred pursuant to art. 8 LPD, which includes protecting occupants' presence and access profiles.
Deploying Secure Remote Access and Recording the Handover of Access Keys
For remote maintenance, troubleshooting, or operation of the installation by the client from outside, access to the home automation network must mandatorily use a robust encrypted link. Two solutions complying with the recognised rules of the trade apply depending on the building typology: setting up a VPN server on the site router or using a certified gateway communicating with a remote relay server via an outbound TLS-encrypted connection.
- Termination of the VPN Tunnel at Local Network LevelDeploy a modern VPN service such as WireGuard or IPsec IKEv2 on the security gateway. Authentication relies on an asymmetric key exchange or an X.509 certificate coupled with a strong password. The tunnel allows the ETS software to reach the local IP address of the KNX gateway as if the technician were plugged directly into the distribution board.
- Activation of the KNX IP Secure ProtocolOn compatible gateways, activate KNX IP Secure mode in the ETS project. The tool encrypts tunnelling frames using the AES-128 algorithm and applies authentication based on the FDSK (Factory Default Setup Key) printed on the device, preventing any injection even within the local subnet.
- Locking Application AccessIf a visualisation interface hosts a web server for smartphones, enforce individual authentication with complex passwords and mandate the HTTPS protocol. Disable factory maintenance accounts.
The contractor is liable for the proper and faithful execution of the work pursuant to art. 364 CO by guaranteeing the durability of the installation without creating unfair dependency. When KNX Data Secure and KNX IP Secure features are activated, ETS generates an encrypted keyring exportable under the knxkeys file extension. Without this file or without the project master password, no other party can reprogram the gateway, read diagnostics, or add a bus device.
Any future remote maintenance service is subject to an explicit agreement defining authorised intervention windows and procedures for temporary deactivation of remote access by the client themselves, thereby guaranteeing the integrity of the home's physical perimeter.
Network Partitioning and IP Bus Traffic Filtering
Connecting a KNX IP gateway directly to the standard subnet of a detached house or office building constitutes a severe technical fault. On the multimedia or office network, client workstations, gaming consoles, mobile devices, and consumer connected devices coexist with an update status beyond the control of the infrastructure manager. A compromise on this segment grants direct access via unencrypted KNXnet/IP telegrams to blind actuators, front entrance electric strikes, and lighting controls. The network electrician installs an impervious physical or logical separation to confine home automation signalling.
- Dedicated Home Automation VLAN
- Virtual subnet isolated at Layer 2 of the OSI model, configured on a managed switch to group interface gateways, IP/KNX routers, supervisory servers, and wall-mounted touchscreens, prohibiting frame broadcasting to other local networks without passing through a secure routing device.
| Source device | Authorised destination | Protocol / Port | Trade function and justification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visualisation server | KNX Gateway / Router | UDP 3671 or TCP/UDP 3671 (Secure) | Exchange of control telegrams and supervisory status feedback |
| Technician ETS workstation | KNX IP Secure interface | Secure TCP/UDP 3671 | Parameter setting, addressing, and downloading of bus devices |
| Office / Guest network | Home Automation VLAN | All protocols | Traffic blocked by security gateway default rule |
| KNX IP gateway | Public network / Internet | All protocols | Outbound prohibited, full isolation without default gateway to the outside |
To ensure isolation, the multimedia cabinet switch applies strict 802.1Q tagging on home automation gateway connection ports. Unused physical ports are administratively disabled. The local firewall systematically blocks inbound network address translation towards the home automation subnet. Remote access for the operator or on-call service transits exclusively through a two-factor authentication VPN concentrator or an approved KNX IoT outbound relay portal, eliminating any open ports to the outside.
ETS Locking, Key Management, and Formal Handover of Access
The software integrity of the home automation installation depends directly on access control to the project in ETS. Leaving a bus device or gateway with the factory password or without a KNX Data Secure certificate allows a third party connected to the bus or local network to overwrite programming or extract the complete group address topology. The installer activates ETS database encryption and applies a strong project password as early as initialisation on the construction site, prohibiting any untraceable modifications.
- Generation and Entry of the Project PasswordDefine a strong password in ETS consisting of at least sixteen alphanumeric characters and symbols to lock access to the building's data archive.
- Pairing of KNX Secure CertificatesScan and import the FDSK (Factory Default Setup Key) keys of each IP gateway and secure device into the ETS project, ensuring mutual authentication and AES-128 encryption.
- Definition of Access Code at Device LevelAssign an individual commissioning key (tool key) to critical bus devices to prohibit memory reading or overwriting by a third party without the original project.
- Encrypted Export of Final ArchiveGenerate the encrypted ETS archive file (.knxproj) immediately after commissioning and installation acceptance testing.
Upon acceptance of the work, the installer hands over all digital assets required for future operation and maintenance to the client or their representative. This handover includes the complete ETS archive, the physical address list, security certificate export keys, and the password schedule. These sensitive data are transferred onto an encrypted physical medium handed over against signature on the technical delivery report.
Management of Architecture Disputes and Refusal of Insecure Compromises
On the construction site, pressure to simplify remote access often arises when the network electrician or AV integrator struggles to reach the gateway. Faced with a request to enable UPnP on the client's router or a demand for raw port forwarding of the tunnelling port, the telematics technician issues a reasoned technical refusal. Opening a port without an encrypted tunnel to a media coupler exposes locking mechanisms, blinds, and lighting controls to automated scanning bots.
Under CO, if any circumstance arises that compromises the regular execution of the work, the contractor must inform the client. A direction from a client or representative demanding direct port opening falls squarely under this duty of written notice. Concurrently, art. 8 LPD requires controllers and subcontractors to ensure data security through appropriate technical and organisational measures. An unprotected bus transmits occupancy states and presence data that constitute personal data.
- Finding and Notification of Non-ConformityAs soon as a network stakeholder attempts to place the KNX gateway in a demilitarised zone (DMZ) or activate direct NAT port forwarding, the telematics technician issues an anomaly notice to the project manager and suspends IP integration.
- Physical Isolation and Temporary DisconnectionThe RJ45 patch lead of the gateway is disconnected from the floor switch. The twisted-pair bus remains fully operational locally without any active gateway to the IT network.
- Proposal of a Compliant AlternativeThe technical file is updated by proposing the installation of a router managing a WireGuard or IPsec VPN server, or the installation of a secure remote access server with two-factor authentication.
- Final Recording in the Formal ReportIf the client formally maintains their instruction despite warnings, the refusal to execute the hazardous configuration is recorded and countersigned in the telecoms acceptance report.
Frequently asked questions
What should be done if the internet service provider replaces the router and overwrites the bus routing?
The service provider's router must never distribute the bus addressing scheme. The telematics technician installs a dedicated infrastructure router behind the provider's box. If the consumer device is replaced or reset to factory settings, the home automation VLAN, firewall rules, and local VPN tunnel remain completely unaffected. Only the technical router's WAN interface requires a quick adjustment to the new provider network.
Why categorically refuse NAT port forwarding for the client's mobile app?
Forwarding UDP port 3671 makes the gateway directly visible on specialised search engines. A malicious third party can inject group telegrams onto the bus without any prior authentication. They can then unlock electric strikes, raise external venetian blinds, or block actuator communication. Remote access must transit exclusively via an encrypted VPN or a secure gateway managing authenticated sessions.
The client misplaces the ETS project password and KNX keyring key: who is liable?
Liability depends on the liability waivers signed upon handover of the work. If the telematics technician recorded the delivery of the project files in the acceptance report, the client bears liability for the loss of their access. Without the factory key or project password, devices protected in secure mode become completely locked out. A full hardware factory reset is then required to reprogram the devices.
How can an IP weather station or video door intercom be connected without exposing the home automation network?
The third-party device is connected to an edge VLAN dedicated to communicating devices. The network switch applies access control lists prohibiting any direct traffic towards the KNX IP bus network. Communication takes place solely via approved application gateways or certified couplers that strictly filter authorised ports. Under no circumstances must the video door intercom have access to the system's ETS programming layer.
Texts and standards cited
- COmaterials and ground: the contractor is liable for the good quality of materials supplied; if materials supplied by the client or ground designated by them are found defective, or if any other circumstance compromises the regular or punctual execution of the work, the contractor must immediately inform the client, failing which they shall bear the consequences (para. 3).
- LPD art. 8data security: controllers and subcontractors ensure, through appropriate organisational and technical measures, adequate personal data security relative to the risk incurred.
